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Introduction to the Topic Radicalization and Prevention

- *English Language*

Project Safety and Diversity in Europe

Efficient Qualification Modules for Prevention of Radicalization for apprentices and staff of private security services in Europe

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Foreword

Whether it's the guarding of refugee shelters, city strips, event protection or the protection of public buildings such as schools and hospitals - all of these areas are highly conflict-prone, discriminatory and violent and require a whole range of different competencies from the security staff. They include skilled moderation and de-escalation skills, high emotion-control skills in conflictual and critical situations, and a **fundamentally democratic stance** that assumes the **equal value** of each human being. In addition - in order to be able to act rationally in the service - a very good self-knowledge with a practiced view for own prejudices and inner pictures. The fact that all these personal competencies - apart from technical - are prerequisites for high-quality work should be a consensus between the providers and customers of security services. At the same time, there is often a stark mismatch between the expectations placed on the quality of private security services and the willingness to reward that service to the extent that would be required to finance the qualifications required everywhere. The European Commission's Erasmus+ program cannot resolve this issue in the two-year project. However, it can certainly support companies by developing a basic training for the operational security personnel, which can be done by using the training manuals that accompany them. This training manual is available for download at www.sicherheitundvielfalt.eu Written in the light of current developments in Europe in the area of right-wing populism and of Islamism, the project focuses on the topic of radicalization prevention.[1] The training of the mentioned manual creates a protective framework on the level of primary and secondary prevention and therefore focuses on to avoid social discrimination by encouraging the elimination of prejudice, by reflecting on one's own unconscious prejudices, and above all by making cognitive structures more flexible and by striving to break up bipolar thinking patterns. This happens beside others. through measures of intercultural learning, methods for dealing with unconscious prejudices and values, as well as country reports from those countries from which many migrants are currently immigrating to Germany. According to the Beutelbach Consensus, these

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[1] Primary prevention serves to prevent radicalization and has a prophylactic intension; secondary prevention also serves as prophylaxis but is focused on risk groups. The term tertiary prevention includes efforts to dissociate ideologies and / or groups, to de-radicalize and to avoid escalation and violence in the case of already stressed persons.

countries are presented in a complex and controversial manner, which does not allow a simple assessment in good or bad. Furthermore, it is part of the training, if necessary, to deal with extremist narratives from the field of racism and right-wing extremism and Islamism. Of course, this also serves to identify possibly already radicalized personnel - after all, a company cannot now choose whether it only must operate at the level of primary and secondary prevention or even tertiary prevention. In addition, there are hints on the creation including identity offers, the design of intergroup contacts and work in various teams as well as the strengthening of ambiguity tolerance and empathy.

This booklet complements the training and aims to close the framework for radicalization prevention and intervention by helping to understand radicalization in order to detect and intervene in signs of incipient or even advanced radicalization - before an offense occurs , It is also important to refer explicitly to the descriptions of phenomena-specific signs and indicators in the Training Manual, as this booklet provides more information on risk factors in the context of radicalization processes and names some selected protective factors.

Radicalization prevention in an entrepreneurial context is certainly not an endeavour that can only be guaranteed through training. At the same time, it is precisely the corporate context that makes consistent action much more successful than is possible with many prevention projects: people spend a large part of their lives in companies, which turns them into meaningful instances of socialization, for better or for worse. A day-to-day corporate and leadership culture that enables people to identify, characterized by mutual recognition, acceptance and appreciation of diversity, which allows for fruitful contacts between different groups and opinions, provides what is arguably the best and most sustainable framework for preventive work. Training sessions are an important and necessary tool.

However, they do not replace daily practice of recognition, diversity and tolerance in companies.

I Radicalization - a complex process

The term radicalization describes a process of appropriating extremist ideologies and belief structures that is complex and complicated.[2] Although different stages of the model show a degree of radicalization, they do not provide a logical or stringent path that has led to radicalization. The factors involved in the radicalization of groups or individuals may be individual, group-specific, interpersonal, structural, historical or cultural. In between are the ideologies that bind people and groups together and create a common identity (Ingroup). Their narratives and myths convey to the individual, as a member of a significantly upgraded social group, a meaning worthy of self-worth and, depending on the degree of radicalization, legitimize violence against enemies (outgroup). In its most pronounced form, the individual's task is to form an ultimate (collective) identity: one's own pluralism gives way to a subordination of one's own social identities to a dominant social category (such as religious affiliation, ethnic origin) that outshines everything else and in doubt This is accompanied by the fight against plurality in society - either by attacking people of the devalued outgroup (s) or even by fighting against the "system" that advocates this plurality. In summary, these are the factors that can promote radicalization:

1. Personal disposition: radical mindset in the sense of personality traits, cognitive schemata and affective states, violent past, etc.
2. Social Environment Factors: Opportunity Structures and Services in the Neighbourhood, Homogenization and Radicalization Dynamics in Radical Groups or Development into Radical Groups, Personal Commitments, Cultural Socialization (e.g., Socialization in Patriarchal and / or Authoritarian Societies or Structures)
3. Socially - perceived or real- structures of injustice and activation of emotions such as anger (in conjunction with personal disposition and affective states mentioned under 1)

All these points are interwoven, and it will never be just a point leading to radicalization. Of course, personal disposition is of great importance, but radicalization

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[2] This is a sociological concept of radicalization. This must be distinguished from the concept of radicalism as it understands and uses the protection of the Constitution. The constitutional protection understands radicalism as a legal method of achieving systemic changes and thus delimits the term from the concept of extremism, which - according to understanding of the constitution - strives for system overcoming

itself usually occurs in groups or through close social relationships. Here social motives play a role as well as distancing and radicalization dynamics within groups. Unjust experiences - whether they are real or perceived is at least insignificant at the beginning - can always lead to radicalization if they are placed in the context of a group ("We Germans", "We Muslims") and the situation is interpreted as a political struggle, the different ideologies offer interpretation patterns here.[3] For example, right-wing extremism and Islamism can be defined as the convergence of inequalities and the acceptance of violence. The respective ideology acts as a myth legitimating violence, at the end of which there is a utopian world of salvation (the ummah in the caliphate, the classless society, pure or pure-bred society, etc.). The statement that racism is when I need the other as a mirror of my own superiority can also be applied to other extremist ideologies. Ultimately, it is always about the need of the individual for a positive social identity.

1.1 Personal disposition

From a criminological-forensic point of view, it is important to emphasize that extremism is not a disease - which of course does not mean that there are no sick people among extremists who accept or prepare for violence. However, there can certainly be talk of a radical mindset that describes certain cognitive thought patterns or personality traits as well as affective states. Saimeh points out in her contribution "On the Significance of Borderline Personality Disorder for the Psychodynamics of Fanatization and Radicalization":[4] "The mechanisms by which radicalization and fanatization work are the cognitive patterns that underlie the demonizing thinking (...) in the development of enemy images can be (...) like a foil on the personality structural characteristics of people with antisocial personality style on borderline structure level. "So, you can speak of a kind of mental fit. among the persons who would potentially be willing to use force (and thus belong to the high-risk individuals for companies), according to the theory of violent true believers, there are various types, some of which are to be exemplified here.[5] The analysis of types of extremist

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[3] Of course, this does not mean legitimate resistance or civil disobedience to injustice structures. These forms of resistance seek to correct a real injustice and, for example, the observance of a pluralistic self-understanding of the state. These movements are motivated by the equality and freedom of every citizen.

[4] Saimeh, Nahlah (2017): p. 213

[5] For a more detailed exploration of the profiling according to the theory of Violent True Believers, the book by Meloy, J. Reid and Hoffmann, Jens (2013): International Handbook of Threat Assessment.

violent criminals is indispensable, as these typologies show that ideology plays only a minor role in many - not all - violent criminals. Identifying individuals solely against extremist narratives of an ideology could lead to blind spots and nasty surprises. The following types should persuade you to take a closer look at certain people and behaviours:

1. **The unshakeable type / Unwavering**

This type represents a closed ideology with an absolute claim to truth. He has a deep belief in his own perfection and larger narcissistic personality as well as the feeling of being part of something greater (often self-image as a scholar). As a rule, this type has higher or university education - also or at least ideological - and regularly occupies key positions in groups. With this type, it is profitable to have a basic understanding of extremist narratives of the ideology, as they have been written in the training manual (see, for example, chapter on Islamism). Prominent examples are here among others. Osama bin Laden or Anders Breivik

2. **The associated type / Affiliative**

This seeks above all social affiliation and recognition, is emotionally dependent on others and for reasons of loyalty to the group also willing to risk his own life sometimes. This type tends to idealize leaders of ideological groups.

3. **The opportunistic type / opportunistic**

This finds its added value as a member of an extremist group, especially in the promise of fame, power and wealth. Third-party attention and recognition are the primary role of this type, while ideology is secondary. Often people of this type are charismatics. A prominent example here is Andreas Baader of the left radical RAF (Red Army Faction), who had a criminal past, was a notorious cheater, highly narcissistic, self-centred and aggressive.

For B., the RAF and left-wing terrorism were, above all, a massive ego-trip: the best way he would ever get to satisfy his fundamentally masculine feelings - including his sexuality - while feeling good about it. Would the Islamic State have

existed at the time, who knows if he would have grown a long beard instead and ridden a stolen sports car to Rakka?[6]

4. The criminal type / Criminal

The Washington Post titled "Today's new terrorists were radical before they were religious" in March 2016, referring to the two brothers who had planned an Islamist attack in Brussels. They had a criminal past without any religious affiliation. This statement also applies to a large part of extreme right-wing perpetrators. Prominent examples from the NSU would be here Uwe B, Holger G. and Beate Z. and - with a slightly different profile - also Ralf W. and André K .: All these persons have been conspicuous in the past by general criminal behaviour and use of force.[7] The ideology acts as a tool for legitimizing violence and makes it possible to morally charge deviant behaviour. The role of right-wing extremist structures, which were present in the surrounding area, is particularly evident at the NSU. One or the other right-wing terrorist would probably have been susceptible to other extremist ideologies as well. Striking is in current forms of right-wing extremism, the narrative of the vigilantes, the self-justification in the name of the people "for the protection of the homeland" justified. The aggression is directed primarily against weak groups and not always primarily against the state. In the Islamist spectrum, the Berlin Christmas Market assassin Anis A. would be a prominent example.

5. Aggressive-revenge-oriented type / Betrayer

In this type real or perceived injustice experiences play a role, which have acted as narcissistic insult. This guy is angry and aggressive, but he / she avoids direct aggression, which is more likely to be in the form of fraud. Self-esteem is usually low, while he / she looks arrogant to the outside.

6. The adolescent type / fledgling

People in adolescent crises form a general risk group. It is not without reason that the Islamic State or many Salafist groups generally speak of youth cultures that

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[6] Neumann, Peter (2016): Terror is with us. Jihadism and Radicalization in Europe.
[7] Quent, Matthias (2017): Actors of Right-Wing Terrorism: Radicalization Trajectories in the NSU Complex.

address men in particular - but not only (!). "In the case of young and presently sometimes infantile terrorist candidates, there are more and more people who are by no means from particularly religious parental homes, but who are radicalized as a conscious demarcation from the adult world and from the parental attitude that is perceived as too weak."[8] The fundamentalist terrorists often come from homes that have opened to the West. (...) Their attacks are directed towards a Western culture in which they wanted to integrate, but in which they failed to achieve a satisfactory integration. "[9]

These perpetrator profiles briefly outlined here are important for enterprise threat management and for identifying high-risk individuals and open the eyes, clarifying very clearly that the ideologization of many potential perpetrators is not particularly profound. Equally important is the view of persons with so-called "authoritarian character", which is characterized by conformism, subservience and a narcissistic identification with glorified sadistic authorities. The mindset of these individuals is very bipolar (good-bad, right-wrong, black-and-white), which in turn results in a high degree of fit with extremist ideologies.

The topic of social identity always plays an important role: "Extremistically oriented persons are motivated to represent and stage their own self in such a way that the extreme message gives them a secure and stable self-concept."[10] Radicalized perpetrators of violence conceive themselves as heroic avant-garde for the true and noble thing. Radical groups stage a veritable culture of narratives and myths expressed through music, symbols, rules and rituals. The individual becomes increasingly de-personalized, but individual identity increasingly disappears behind a single social identity. All of this requires conformity, obedience and authoritarian submission.

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[8] Saimeh, Nahlah (2017): On the Importance of the Borderline Personality Organization for the Psychodynamics of Fanatization and Radicalization. P. 217
[9] Viannai, G. (2006): The urge to violence. Social psychology of war readiness and terrorism. P. 7-29
[10] Zick, Andreas (2017): Extremist Staging: Elements and Paths of Radicalization and Deradicalization Processes. In: Böckler, Nils & Hoffmann, Jens: Radicalization and terrorist violence. Perspectives from case and threat management.

I.II Social environment factors

As was already clear from the biographical examples, social environment factors play a decisive role. Belong to these

a) **Inter-personal relationships (friends, partners, family):** Considering the social needs of people, reference is made here to the described typologies of violent true believers. From experience, we know that these relationships also work remotely.

b) **inter-group identifications and group dynamics**: research on radicalization processes has shown that members of extremist groups are undergoing a long and graduated socialization process. When people meet extremist groups, the focus is on building personal relationships. As a rule, she gradually introduces a mentor to the organization. Decisive steps of radicalization can only take place after joining groups. This long step-by-step process means that former members of radical groups cannot answer the question, "When did they radicalize?". The shifts from the norm tend to go unnoticed by the actors involved. Clark McCauley calls this creeping phenomenon Slippery Slope. In addition, groups generally tend to homogenize opinions and polarize - if the conditions are favourable. For example, group discussions among rather like-minded people often lead to a noticeable shift in the group's opinion towards majority opinion. In the process, those actors who are particularly uncompromising in their commitment to the group are always particularly influential. More moderate members approach the radical positions or leave the group. Both phenomena are particularly effective if the concern is considered particularly significant - e.g. The protection of the forests - and the commitment was not crowned with success. The means to achieve the purpose or purposes are becoming increasingly uncompromising and undemocratic until ultimately they can no longer be reconciled with pluralistic opinions and methods of the liberal democratic order. As an illustrative example, McCauley mentions the supporters of the SNCC (Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee), who first appeared very moderately and constitutionally in the

1960s. "Six years later, they propagated" black power "and the armed struggle against the whites."[11]

c) **Opportunity structures:** here again reference is made to the biographical examples in 1.1 Personal Dispositions - see here, for example, the opportunity structures in the immediate vicinity of the NSU. Saimeh points out: "Which extremist ideology is chosen depends sometimes on which radicalizing milieu the access succeeds in and which radical or extremist ideology fits into the historically grown, socio-political context."[12]

In summary, radicalization is always a group-based process because it picks up on social identities, defines in-group and out-group relationships, and makes it clear who and which social group (s) are enemies or friends. It is always about group identities and social self-location. "Even the radicalization of individuals is influenced by extremist groups, or communitarian forms, societies or religions, with which people identify in the radicalization process and for whose extremist goals they enter."[13] Because radicalization is thus a social process, which is usually in. If groups find themselves, it is obvious that further extremist tendencies in the company can be expected to affect other people.

I.III Societal - perceived or real - injustice structures

Many biographies of extremists show periods of failure such as school problems, periods of unemployment and a general predicament of criminal behaviour or at least criminal phases. Right-wing extremists or even Islamist ideologies offer people a holistic explanation for their failure. This applies especially to right-wing extremism. Ideology no longer makes one's own biography a personal failure, providing stability and self-esteem. Once again, the above-mentioned opportunity structures are crucial, as both extreme left-wing, right-wing extremist and Islamist ideologies can interpret

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[11] McCauley, Clark & Moskalenko, Sophia (2011): How and why do people become radical? Mechanisms of radicalization of individuals and groups. In: LpB Baden-Wuerttemberg (2011): The citizen in the state. Radicalization and terrorism in the West.

[12] Saimeh, Nahlah (2017): On the Importance of the Borderline Personality Organization for the Psychodynamics of Fanatization and Radicalization. P. 207. In Böckler, Nils & Hoffmann, Jens: ibid.

[13] Zick, Andreas (2017): Extremist Staging: Elements and Paths of Radicalization and Deradicalization Processes.

their own failure. At the same time, it legitimizes and lends force to persons who, in any case, have an affinity to violence, possibly because of educational and social conditions.

"Radicalized people experience themselves as disadvantaged compared to supposedly privileged persons, they experience themselves as victims of a hostile and" unfair "society, a society" enforced "by hostile forces, which supposedly" suffers "from this" enforcement "and to their recovery radical cure of the elimination of those demonic forces responsible for all evil is necessary. This radical cure then usually requires of the individual "victim" and an "effort" ("jihad"), whose reward after successful struggle is a pure social order and world order. "[14]

II. Explanatory and prevention approaches

The capacity for radicalization certainly has its starting point in the fact that man is a social being: he has a need to belong to other people and to "his group" - or less radically printed - to "his groups". These can now come from the immediate environment or be a social construct or imagined and create the meaning that humans need for their and their lives. It becomes difficult when one social identity forces all others into the background, subordinates or outshines them, when sensory inconsistencies, diversity and contradictions cannot be endured or tolerated, and the need for consistency and uniqueness dominates - and wants to be enforced. In the 6 stages of radicalization according to the model of R. Eckert[15], the initial feeling of irritation and the disturbance of strangeness is followed by 5 stages to the last stage of violent extremism, which is characterized by the struggle for the ideal society (e.g. the Aryan nation etc.). The desire for or the clouding of belonging by the alleged stranger makes itself depending on dispositions in different scales of a destructive defence just this stranger air. An explanatory model for this radicalization scheme is the theory of relative deprivation.

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[14] Saimeh, Nahlah (2017): p. 216
[15] Eckert, R. (2013): Radicalization - A Sociological Perspective. In: APuZ. From Politics and Contemporary History: Deradicalization.

II. I Relative Deprivation

Relative deprivation means that a person - as an individual, but also as a member of a social group - has the impression of having less than it deserves. In this constellation, people tend to develop strong emotions such as anger or indignation, so that relative deprivation is also apt to trigger collective behaviours. Relative deprivation is predominantly the result of a social comparison but may also be e.g. due to comparisons with an (idealized) past. The decisive factor is the feeling of an unjustified - that is, illegitimate - collective disadvantage. When the call for immigration restrictions for refugees becomes loud, it is often said "they take away our work". A collective movement is

therefore, preceded by a sacrifice. This can be real - and is this too often - or just perceived. Decisive now are the demands (and of course the proportionality of means) that result from a real or perceived disadvantage: A demand for equal participation in the pluralistic society is traceable in actual marginalization - after all, this is a central promise of open society - and is not accompanied by the absolutization of a social category (such as Muslim, Christian, Kurd, etc.) and their value and meaning construction. However, a social group that demands a state under the domination of a social category and at the same time sets its own values absolutely, does not pursue a goal that is compatible with a free democratic basic order, with the preservation of all personality and individual rights, but pursues a totalitarian utopia.

II.II Prejudices, stereotypes and group-focused enmity (GMF)

Man often categorizes his impressions according to unconscious patterns of thinking and fades out seemingly insignificant things. So, he falls pre-judgments. The categories also include the social categories in which people classify themselves and others, and thus also delineate them - for example, the prevailing bipolar division between men and women. Categorizations in self- and out-of-group groups are always important starting points for the development of a social identity. The socially shared beliefs about the members of a social category are referred to as stereotypes. They have a functional role, yet they allow people to judge - and, above all, to evaluate - even if there is no information beyond the information on the category of a person. They are associated with behavioural expectations that make it easier for us to socialize with a person and to formulate hypotheses about what might be the appropriate behaviour for that person. Stereotypes are the result of an adaptive

process of self-categorization and sense-making. Their content is context-dependent and variable and not template-like. Because of this contextuality, stereotypes are based on intragroup processes and are not the result of an intra-individual categorization process. The devaluation of the other therefore needs motivational framework conditions - e.g. the threat to social identity through similarities of social groups in a real or perceived competition.

Social discrimination is not only the result of stereotypes (and sub-types) but is significantly influenced by self-regulatory skills: the need for positive self-esteem - after so-called positive distinctiveness - leads to social discrimination. Alien instead of self-directed anger is thus a functional behaviour in this context. The concept of positive distinctiveness is characterized by the fact that the social self-group is positively differentiated from the outgroup in order to increase self-esteem. People with low self-esteem tend to be more likely to discriminate, although it cannot be said conclusively to what extent self-esteem is a stable or rather situational person characteristic. From the fact that people with high self-esteem are increasingly inclined towards fairness in intergroup relationships, and those with low values tend to follow social discrimination, the importance of corporate and leadership culture to avoid social discrimination. Authoritarian

leadership (or even abusive leadership) or the promotion of inter-disciplinary competition are therefore not conducive to countering or avoiding social discrimination.

According to Allport, discrimination is "all behaviour based on differences of a social or natural nature that have no relation to individual skills or merit, nor to the actual behaviour of the individual person."[16] Social discrimination includes discrimination against a person based on their group affiliation. Among other things, it can be attributed to one or more phenomena of so-called group-related enmity (GMF). The term GMF goes back to the Bielefeld conflict and violence researcher Wilhelm Heitmeyer and describes hostile attitudes towards people because of their origin (social, ethnic religious) or their lifestyle.[17] At the same time, GMF is a syndrome, as it describes that different ideologies of inequality can occur simultaneously or in

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[16] Allport, G.W. (1954): The Nature of Prejudice.
[17] Comp. Heitmeyer, W. (2012): Group-focused enmity (GMF) in an unlocked decade. In: Heitmeyer, W. (Hg.) German states. Frankfurt a. M.

correlation, e.g. Sexism and anti-Semitism or devaluation of the disabled and devaluation of the unemployed.

II.III Stigmatization and social discrimination in examples

The self-conception of many Germans is further that the one is German (r) who is of German descent. A constitutional patriotism has not been able to establish itself to the desired extent. This often makes people with a migration background in Germany "aliens for all time". If the migration background paired with a darker skin or hair colour or paired with religious symbols such as the headscarf, there is a constant social categorization and depersonalization of the migrant. The respective actors therefore have no choice whatsoever: they inevitably must deal intensively with their social category. This can lead to a very differentiated approach to the social category, but it can also lead to an exaggerated rejection or identification with the social category. The category can not only be "foreigner" or "Turk", but also "Muslim" or "Muslima". Moreover, "foreigner", "Turk" or "Muslim" is often more than just a social category. It is stigma in many cases. In case of doubt, a Turkish Muslim is therefore subject to double stigmatization and thus multiple discrimination. This is reflected in social discrimination. Migrants in general also have more barriers to accessing jobs and housing, as measured by their level of education. Even in their personal environment, they are sometimes discriminated against openly. Openly hostile reservations - especially against Muslim migrants - are both an integral part of the media and of direct experience. Now, openly discriminatory acts in Germany apply to socially undesirable and outlawed behaviours, so that most racism and the bulk of Islamophobia are not directly demonstrated. For example, it is not clear to the person concerned if he has now received the job cancellation because of his group affiliation or if it is caused by him. This permanent uncertainty of explanation and the fear of rejection have a direct impact on the lives of those affected. Members of stigmatized groups are more likely to suffer from mental illnesses such as depression than members of non-stigmatized groups. Fearful persons who are afraid of rejection due to their group affiliation also suffer a significant reduction in their performance: African-American students who strongly identify with their stigma, after two years at the university, performed significantly worse than those in only one year little identified with their stigma. The effort to self-regulate. The effort for positive

distinctiveness of one's own person and group leads to a depletion of the regulatory capacity and thus reduces performance.

Another key way of re-emphasizing one's own damaged self-image is to explain the partially observable tendency, failure (in the housing market, in a job interview, in finding a partner) through social discrimination, because it is the individual of debt relieved. The appropriate emotional response is not guilt but anger. In a next step - or as a separate step - there is the possibility to

process the stigmatization in such a way, by adopting the stigma, positively revaluing it and counter stigmatizing the stigmatizing actors themselves. "Not I am wrong or bad, but they are!" Here would be the slogan. Radicalization would thus be the result of an identity damage that uses the method of counter stigmatization as a form of self-regulation.

II. IV Intergroup contacts promote diversity and create balance in the company

Social discrimination is necessarily based on the division of people into a "we" (in-group) and a "they" (outgroup) group. For this reason, interventions to improve the relationship between different groups often focus on precisely the point of categorization. So, there are different models of how to make intergroup contacts - contacts between the groups between which you want to improve the relationship. For companies, this depends on the respective composition of the teams, on the intergroup situation (status, power, group size), the situational conditions (cooperative climate or competitive climate), the time for moderated intergroup contacts and interindividual differences. Especially when stronger conflicts give reason to intervene at intergroup level, a multi-level process is advisable. As a first step, the aim should be to get a more personal view of the other person or group. The negative impressions should be "personalized and individualized" (so-called de-categorization) - the groups or persons act as individuals. If it remains at this level, individual conflicts between employees can be solved, but there is no fundamental transfer to the social group of the other. So, the generalization is missing.

Therefore, the second step - after having overcome reservations with the person classified as different - should be to explicitly consider differences between groups (so-called mutual differentiation). This refers to the fact that every human being, even though his affiliation to different social groups, also has different experiences and

causes external reactions. It is important to capture these initial situations and perspectives. In principle, the person who accompanies such processes should always keep in mind and include the diversity of everyone - that is, look at different social categories in order to avoid overemphasizing intergroup differences. People who promote a multiple and complex identity structure are less prone to outgroup devaluation than those who have few social categories that shape their self-image. Finally, in a third step, a joint in-group - a common in-group - should be developed, involving all employees of the company or department. On the part of the management, it is necessary to present the self-understanding of the company in a continuous and credible manner and to bring it to life. For example, the company promotes a consciously cosmopolitan identity if the company is globally active or the composition is very heterogeneous. The point here is to implement an overarching positive corporate identity, all of which are integrated, and to which one is proud - as an employee in a globally active or heterogeneous company. Of course, such an identity must be communicated on an ongoing basis - for example through mission statements from the management. Sustainable effectiveness is therefore only possible if structural causes of intergroup conflicts are also considered.

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